Relying on a number 5 on two wickets where really their top order should perform feels a little risky to me.
It’s definitely a risk.
I was trying to find stats on the grounds previously, and didn’t uncover much. Blundstone seems fairly bowler friendly to me,
from the career averages of some of the Hurricanes.
In the absence of better data, this is the total number of balls faced by the top 3 in games at Blundstone this season (given the top 3 are the ones preventing #5 coming in). Hobart first, then opponent:
33, 11
70, 94
81, 61
15, 25
Ave: 50, 48
Only one game at UTAS, which was 55, 31 (midpoint 43).
So if the top 3 face, say, 50 balls, that leaves David with up to 35 to face, if he doesn’t get dismissed and gets half the strike. At his strike rate he would get a 50 off that many balls, and we’d score 80+ from batting. Of course, he may be dismissed earlier, but that’s not what we are worried about here.
Looking at the individual innings, I think the ones where we’d be getting a bit antsy if we owned David as VC would be the 81 (coming in at 14th over, c. 20 balls to bat) and the 94 (16th over, c. 13 balls to bat). In the first instance, he should easily get a quick 20 if he bats 20 balls, but obviously is unlike to go huge. In the second, he could be lineball to get the quick 20 (he would narrowly get there on career SR, but likely starts a fraction slower and may miss out). Overall it’s 2 out of 10 innings at those two grounds this season where it looks like being a concern using this approach.
Batting first provides some insulation, his record is much weaker batting second, in part because his batting opportunity is likely to be more constrained (eg if his bowlers dismiss the opposition for 120).